Challenges to Implementation:

World Bank Participation

For Africa, the WB’s first half-century since establishment resulted in increased malnutrition, currency devaluation, and more virulent strains of malaria. More recently, during the 1999 fiscal year, the WB loaned US$2.07 billion to Africa. The money financed fifty-six projects covering the “broad palette of World Bank expertise from environmental protection to infrastructure reengineering to bridging the digital divide.” [1]   Since its establishment, the Bank has financed similar projects across Africa totaling US$13 billion. [2] Regarding current loan policies, Nicholas Stern, WB’s chief economist and senior vice president, states:

The bank’s current approach is to recognize that poor countries require a certain level of governance and accountability to be able and willing to use WB loans effectively. Countries with governments too corrupt, too predatory or too weak to ensure public safety will not get bank loans in the future, because the money would never reach the poor people for whom it is intended. [3]

The WB’s money, however, is not reaching its intended recipients. Ironically, in terms of acronym use, macroeconomic reforms in the 1980s and 90s, known as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP), caused Africa’s per capita income to fall 20% to levels that existed in the 1960s. [4] Furthermore, in order to maintain current levels of poverty, African economies will have to grow by 5% per year, while  Sub-Saharan Africa’s total debt in 1994 amounted to 110% of its GNP. [5] The WB’s work is clearly not serving to alleviate poverty but institutionalizing it.

In terms of environmental projects and programs, Bush argues that the “World Bank’s record on environmental management has been disastrous.” [6] Emphasizing his stance against the World Bank, he asserts that, since the early 1980s, the WB’s strategy for structural adjustment lending has encouraged export-led growth, which has contributed to the environmental problems of African countries engaging in strategies for sustainable forestry and the prevention of dryland degradation, similar aims of the NBI. [7] Therefore, in terms of the Nile, the World Bank’s involvement in attempting to achieve equitable and sustainable use of Nile waters could result in greater degradation of cropland and water.

In asserting their role as facilitator of the NBI, the World Bank emphasizes the need for all riparians to participate in constructive dialogue and believes that the NBI provides a unique forum for the Nile states to pursue cooperative development and environmental management. [8] Furthermore, “The World Bank is committed to supporting the NBI and will respond to the financial requests by the Nile countries on a case-by-case basis.” [9] In addition, in response to concerns regarding the Bank’s capacity to finance NBI projects, the WB’s maintains that due to requests from the Nile Basin Council of Ministers, they are working to raise and coordinate support from other donors on the most favorable terms available. [10]

            Despite accounts of NBI successes and national strategies to prevent further social instability, the initiative has little hope of achieving its goals in large part because of the international community’s-specifically the World Bank’s- involvement and funding. Addis Ababa University Professor of Political Science, Yacob Arsano, argues that NBCs distrust the donor community and believe that they either do not understand or are not aware of the intricacies of the situation. According to Environmental Agendas in the Ethiopian Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, “The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have played the single role in the impoverishment of the African continent.” [11] David Korten argues, “The IMF and World Bank have arguably done more harm to people than any other pair of nonmilitary institutions in human history.” [12] In the 1999 World Bank critique by the Meltzer Commission, Chairman Allan H. Meltzer asserts:

The WB is an overstaffed, ineffective, bureaucratic institution. It has dedicated professionals committed to development and poverty relief. Yet, by its own admission, half of its projects are unsuccessful, and the failure rate is even higher in the poorest countries. The bank’s management must stop its current public-relations flimflam and start improving its effectiveness in reducing poverty.” [13]

Thus, the WB’s NBI future looks doubtful, especially considering that six of the world’s ten poorest countries are in the Nile Basin.

In support of the World Bank, advocates state that while some of the bank’s programs have failed, those failures resulted from misguided efforts to reward Western allies during the Cold War, which were programs that the bank was pressured to support by the US. [14] Sachs maintains that the WB has been forced to make do with too few resources. Furthermore, he argues that “for most of the problems, responsibility lies with major donor countries, not with the professionalism of the bank.” It is interesting to note that Assistant Resident Representative Girma Hailu of the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP), a NBI donor, stated, in response to questioning on the WB’s African and environmental record, “The World Bank has not had a bad record in African related matters.” [15] Despite the level of World Bank failure in Africa, those organizations receiving financial and administrative assistance from the WB support it and its programs rather than opposing the WB’s notorious involvement in African projects or insisting upon policy and program reforms.

The WB and its members (specifically the US, European Union, and Canada) are concerned with Egypt’s interests because of its strategic location as an entry into the Middle East. Egypt’s stability directly affects the stability of the Middle East, which influences the petroleum market, an area of greater importance to the Western world than stability in the Nile Basin. Furthermore, according to Seifulaziz Milas, a consultant from InterAfrica Group (IAG), Egypt’s well-known threats of military involvement serve more as a method of acquiring greater funding and support from the international community. [16] Thus, Egypt increases its funding levels while preventing downstream development and maintaining current water allocations. In addition, according to Arsano, Ethiopia will not develop because they do not want to show bad conduct to international donors. He states that the Ethiopian government will “accept whatever the WB says because they depend on WB funding.” [17] According to another donor partner, CIDA, "the countries, not the WB, own the NBI." Similar to the UNDP response regarding the WB’s African and environmental record, Second Secretary at the Canadian Embassy in Addis Ababa, Caroline Lavoie, stated, “They are just a bank.” [18] Again, institutions aided, either financially or administratively, by the WB refuse to acknowledge the power of its involvement in development projects.

WB Operational Policy 7.50 (OP7.5), however, illustrates that the WB has a great deal more influence. OP7.5 applies to the following types of international waterways: “any river  . . . that forms a boundary between, or any river . . . that flows through two or more states, whether Bank members or not.” [19] Regarding water resources development projects, OP7.5 affects the following: “hydroelectric, irrigation, flood control . . . industrial and similar projects that involve the use or potential pollution of international waterways.” [20] OP7.5 prohibits WB assistance to water resources development projects of upstream countries without downstream approval, which serves to discourage downstream countries’ participation in collaborative negotiations. For instance, OP7.5 states that “Following notification, if the other riparians raise objections to the proposed project, the Bank in appropriate cases may appoint one or more independent experts to examine the issues.” [21] As Milas explains, the OP7.5 functions as more, operating as a veto for the Egyptian government concerning downstream water resource development. Furthermore, according to Milas, the OP7.5 is at the heart of the NBI, and its preservation will function as an instrument of failure in the NBI agenda. [22] Thus, the WB's own policies will restrict the realization of the NBI’s objectives.

A World Bank economist, choosing to remain anonymous, argues that unless it admits failure, “the WB forfeits any credibility about what it has done right.” [23] Acknowledging failure presents larger problems in terms of WB operation. As economist William Easterly states, “The WB has measured its own performance and those of its departments and professional staff largely by the number of loans they make, not by the success of the projects those loans make possible.” [24] If accepting inefficacy will lead to potential accomplishments, then, as Vesely argues, “successes in one area will open opportunities in others in more developing regions, and Africa can benefit from virtuous circles involving different aspects of development.” [25] Regardless of the level of Bank achievement in realizing its mission, according to Baines, removing the largest lending institution from the development sphere is not the answer, despite the concern that African aid dependency makes the entire continent vulnerable to the Bank’s erratic and detrimental policies. [26] He states, “While no better alternatives exist, Africa cannot continue to develop without the World Bank aid.” [27] Thus, despite innumerable failures caused by the World Bank’s active participation in Africa, the institution should not end its assistance programs. The damage caused due to aid dependency, as Cox asserts, prevents the process of political, economic, and social development. [28] Dependency, however, necessitates legitimate funding to promote the collaborative involvement of the WB and organizations working within the communities to ensure complete efficiency in NBI development, as well as all other projects under the guidance of the World Bank. While Baines contends no better options to the WB exist, maintenance of current patterns will not solve Africa’s poverty. Until such alternatives emerge, the WB’s continued involvement will cause further degradation of the continent and prevention of a Nile Basin “common vision.’

NGO involvement

            According to the provisions of the NBI, the program “welcomes the contribution of NGOs and encourages NBCs to continue in close cooperation with civil society and the private sector.” [29] At the June 2001 ICCON meeting, various donors, including bilateral and UN agencies, explained the importance of NGO and civil society engagement to the initiative and to their continued involvement as donors. [30] According to Vesely, the WB favors giving aid directly to non-governmental agencies with roots in local communities, rather than to government ministries, a statement contradicted by the WB’s actions. [31] More realistically in terms of donor and government rationale, UNDP’s representative, Hailu, states that NGOs should not be involved until political and legal affairs have reached consensus, because it is too early to involve NGOs on a political or legal level. [32] Attempts to implement ideology and end hypocrisy will enable NGOs and civil society to play their necessary roles as partners in the NBI to facilitate long-term and equitable success.

            In the NGO and Civil Society Discourse Statement, representatives of Nile Basin NGOs maintain that civil society needs to be partners to the NBI for several strategic reasons. These include, while acknowledging the involvement of NGOs in all aspects and stages of development programs such as the NBI is well established as Good Practice, the inclusion of civil society and NGOs in the process will strengthen the NBI and help ensure its success. [33] Furthermore, within the Nile Basin region, limited human resources and skills exist. These resources and skills, however, transpire within NGOs and civil society institutions spread throughout the Basin. Nile Basin NGOs argue “NGO and civil society involvement will help to facilitate the projects proposed by the NBI that will build confidence in these processes and contribute to convergence within the basin.” [34] In 2001, the World Conservation Union (IUCN) agreed to the establishment of a Discourse Desk in Entebbe, Uganda, which will serve as the center of NGO and civil society discussion on the NBI. Abrams states, that the process of Desk institution “is underway, even if it seems slow at times. The development of projects which make up the NBI is equally having to chart an intricate course.” [35] Thus, while the international community and civil society recognize that the NBI cannot succeed without NGO involvement, the formation of a central NGO dialogue forum will not be realized until the proposed projects of the NBI have been achieved.

            Currently, IAG is the only Ethiopian NGO directly dealing with the NBI. Milas maintains that their involvement is a result of previous research done on the Ethiopian component of the NBI. Despite IAG’s successful involvement in the NBI process, the actions of the Ethiopian government function to undermine the efforts of other legitimate NGOs. Through discussions with many Ethiopian NGOs, including Pact Ethiopia, PANOS Ethiopia, Center for Human Environment, WaterAid, Christian Relief and Development Agency (CRDA), and the Institute for Sustainable Development, the government hinders social, political, and economic grassroots programs facilitated by NGOs. [36] Negative personification of NGOs through media, excessive formalities in the registration process, and the lack of due process [37] in abolishing legitimate NGOs enables to the government to generate substantial challenges to NGO programs and missions. For example, the Ethiopian Free Press Journalists’ Association received government recognition in March 2001, seven years after its initial application for registration. [38]

Akalewold Bantirgu from CRDA explained that the Ministry of Water Resources states that NGOs are executing partners rather than policy makers. Based on NGO interviews and statements, IAG’s success regarding governmental cooperation appears more a result of their political connections to the government rather than their work as a “non-governmental” agency. All NGOs interviewed, with the exception of IAG, state that the majority of IAG employees are former Ethiopian government workers, thereby having established connections and relationships within the Ethiopian administration, which allows for a greater voice in political, economic, and social matter, including NBI proceedings. Despite NGO consensus regarding government opposition and IAG’s NGO legitimacy, Milas argues, “there is no hesitation from the Ethiopian government or WB to involve NGOs because they realize that the NBI involves all Ethiopian peoples.” [39] In contrast, Bantirgu asserts that the WB creates deliberate misunderstandings between the government and NGOs. [40] Camille de Stoop of the Forum For Environment states that “national opposition to NGOs stems from the concern that Ethiopian NGOs will mobilize foreign governments to recognize the deficiencies of the Ethiopian government.” [41] As stated previously however, through the collaborative involvement of the WB and NGOs, national governments would be forced to contribute to the mission and undertakings of NGOs. Hence, government paranoia would be transferred to cooperative programs with NGOs knowledgeable of local systems. Such understanding would include specific community cultural aspects, key political, economic, and social community ideologies, local resource availability, and trust within the community. By including NGOs in its proceedings (planning and action), the NBI would realize its goals of confidence building through a regionally reproductive cycle of state/civil society alliances.

Nile Basin Politics

            According to Drake, until the 1950s, British colonialism and administration reduced water resource development and use tensions. [42] The political fragmentation of the independent Nile region began with the creation of sovereign states and an increasing ethnic consciousness, resulting in growing disparities and rivalries among the diverse populations of the Nile Basin. Consequently, all nations now take a more competitive and nationalistic approach to regional politics. [43] During the 1970s, Ethiopia was ruled by Colonel Mengistu Haile-Mariam’s Marxist regime. Soviet experts, invited by the colonel, began studying the possibility of damming the Nile’s tributaries and exploiting its water, provoking Egypt to threaten the destruction of any new dams through military force. [44] Rushdie Saeed, an Egyptian expert on water issues, argues that “although such threats gave rise to the commonly held notion that future African wars would be over water, the fact is that these tensions were a spin-off of the Cold War.” [45] Thus, based on Saeed’s argument, present and future conflicts will have Cold War foundations. The tension over Nile water, however, have colonial underpinnings because of the consequences of the various Nile Waters Treaty, in which nations with colonial representation (Egypt and Sudan) were able to exploit the resources of those without (Ethiopia). The proposals made during the Cold War era were products of colonial actions, and the subsequent threats were a continuation of Egyptian fears regarding the maintenance of the Nile flows. Therefore, colonial policies and manipulations, not Cold War strategies, helped create the past tensions and potential conflicts over Nile waters.

            Despite Saeed’s position, since the end of the Cold War, the Nile has continued to invoke political tension. During the early 1990s, for example, relations between Egypt and Sudan were strained following alleged efforts by the Sudanese government to overthrow Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak. In addition, Sudan and Ethiopia formed the Blue Nile Valley Organization and pledged to study several major infrastructure projects despite Egyptian disapproval. In response, Mubarak threatened military intervention. [46] Regardless of the foundations of conflict over the Nile, with the end of Cold War, an initiative like the NBI has serious potential, a program previously inconceivable at the time when US-Soviet Union antagonism played itself out in the various regional rivalries, including Sudan and Egypt. [47]

While the necessity for Ethiopia to utilize its water resources persists with growing pressure from civil society and the international community, any development would alter the Blue Nile flow, which poses a threat to the agricultural, social, economic, and political livelihood of Egypt and Sudan. Despite the existence of water use treaties between Egypt and Sudan, Ethiopia has not been party to these major agreements and, consequently, does not feel bound by them. Instead, Ethiopia claims sovereignty over usage of the Blue Nile and recognizes the untapped potential of irrigation projects and the need to expand its hydroelectric production. Applying the distribution conflict theories argued by Gleick and Haftendorn, such discrepancies in allocation claims, serving as one of the fundamental sources of Nile Basin strife, have the potential for violence and military action. [48] Regardless of conflict possibilities and Nile distribution claims, limited economic and institutional capacity, the complex hydropolitics of the Nile Basin, and an unstable security position in the Horn of Africa restrict Ethiopia’s options. [49] Furthermore, analogous to Cox’s scarcity theories, any nation with a scarcity of one or more key resources would constitute a significant disadvantage. [50] Thus, while Ethiopia controls the source of Nile, its lack of economic and institutional assets prevents it from utilizing the available water supplies.

Islam also plays an important role in Nile Basin politics, specifically in Egypt and Sudan. Islamic tradition is pervasive and the fundamental and legal significance of water is enshrined in the word for law itself, shar’ia. Before it denoted law, for example, shar’ia signified the law of water, literally meaning the path or road that leads to water. [51] Therefore, despite statements that Egyptian military interventions are hollow or issued to increase aid levels, such threats should be sincerely recognized in terms of the significance of water in Islamic practice.

With regard to resource development, Sudan is incapable of its expanding water use because of civil war, economic recession, and a shortage of foreign investment. Sudan, however, has the potential to become “the breadbasket of the Middle East,” [52] but that would be possible only with increased use of Nile water. Thus, by applying the conclusions of the CIA’s state failure assessment, the large parallels between Sudan’s state instability and environmental scarcity limits the possibilities of regional conflict prevention and cooperation. [53] Egypt, however, benefits from Sudan’s insecurity. Water shortages already exist but Egypt has been able to mask this because war-torn Sudan is unable to use its full quota agreed in 1959. [54] Therefore, if Sudan were to end its long period of civil war, Egypt would face another opponent in the competition for Nile water allocations.

As stated by Jo Raisin, a consultant on issues of food security with the US Agency for International Development, the projects of the NBI will take at least 20 years to implement, as a result of the present political environment, in which each nation faces similar crises in terms of water scarcity, extreme poverty, food insecurity, recurrent drought, and large population increases. [55]   Ninety-five percent of Egypt’s population lives on the banks of the Nile. Ethiopia’s population expects to grow from 65.8 million to 186 million in 2050, while only 1.7% of arable land in Ethiopia is irrigated compared to 100% of Egypt’s. [56] Of the three giants, Egypt faces the most obvious water crisis, and the situation is becoming more severe each year. Its population of 69 million is growing annually by more than one million. Egypt is almost completely dependent on the Nile and claims that prior usage entitles it to a disproportionate share of the river’s waters. With over ninety-five percent of agricultural production from irrigated land, Egypt needs to expand its agricultural land and reduce the saltwater intrusion of the Mediterranean into the Nile delta, goals threatened by growing water shortages. [57] The amount of time needed by Egypt to diversify its economy and to provide alternative jobs for its citizens is a long and slow-moving process. [58]

Historical relationships between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia have been based on exploitation rather than cooperation, and as Arsano stated, Egypt has never trusted Ethiopia because of Ethiopia’s historical power, in the sense that it was never conquered or colonized. Arsano argues:

Diplomatic agreements will give Ethiopia more negotiating power. Egypt, however, does not want to give its adversary more power. Egyptian fear is misplaced. They are afraid of their own interests. Egyptian paranoia can create Ethiopian fear that Egypt is too powerful. [59]

In addition, Egypt threatens the use of military action against further water resource development because it is something they cannot control. According to Milas, however, Egypt issues idle threats. He explains that while they are stronger militarily than Ethiopia and other upstream countries, the geographical distances between NBCs creates a different situation, one in which conflict is less likely to occur. Instead, as stated earlier, Egypt’s threats are used to discourage donor assistance to upstream countries. [60] Furthermore, Egypt must trust that Ethiopia will export and sell their power supplies. Considering the historically volatile relationship between the countries, the issue of trust is considerable. [61] Raisin asserts, “Historical distrust, conflict over the Nile, and stale foreign relations are not issues solved quickly.” [62] Thus, while confidence building is a goal of the NBI, it faces a much stronger adversary in terms of political relations and historical exploitation. As Loulseged stated, “Until the agreement of 1959 is null and void, cooperation will be unsustainable.” [63] Moreover, similar to Lowi’s high/low political theory, Egypt will prevent from compromising its sovereignty in the name of cooperation because of its regional authority. [64] If Egypt refuses to engage in collaborative discussions and projects, the maintenance of the status quo will persist and the NBI will be never fully realized.

Additional challenges to the NBI concern construction of new hydroelectric facilities. The relocation and resettlement of highlanders to the lowlands of Ethiopia present serious potential for intrastate conflict. The displacement of peoples and their subsequent migration increases land degradation due to movement to ecologically sensitive areas, ethnic tensions, and state instability. The construction of Egypt’s 1952 Aswan Dam, 1960s Awash Project (3 dams in Ethiopia), and Sudan’s 1965 Roseires Dam displaced 200,000, 20,000, and 10,000 people, respectively. Fortunately, these projects, while exerting additional pressure on natural resources, did not lead to large-scale conflict. Conca et al theories, however, argue that land degradation and growing pressure on water resources is a significant factor in environmentally induced conflicts. Adopting their approach to social implications of water scarcity, the achievement of the NBI’s projects will increase the likelihood of state and regional conflict. Therefore, while the development of large-scale projects such as dams and irrigation benefits governments and pleases international donors, the effects of these endeavors will lead to further problems extraneous to the aims of the NBI.

Future of the Nile Basin

            The issues working against a successful NBI prove to be a stronger opponent than the international donor community intended. Thus far, the most critical achievement of NBI has been getting all NBCs together in diplomatic discussions regarding water allocations. Governments and the donor community also perceive other positives resulting from the initiative. Hailu affirms that implementation will occur within the next three years because negotiations have been so successful and present issues will not take longer than three years to solve. [65] Loulseged states, “issues have changed from conflict to cooperation, while translating visions into practical implementation.” [66] According to Egypt’s Minister of Public Works, Mahmoud Abu Zied, despite the high level of potential to utilize the Nile in a sustainable manner, the basic challenge of the equitable use of the Nile has yet to be realized. Zied states, “The River Nile still has a great potential which is not yet exploited and which can be a great benefit to the people of the Nile basin. Each country is entitled to an equitable share from the river without causing appreciable harm to the other riparian states.” [67] Zied, representative of the Egyptian government, takes special consideration in stating that all NBCs are entitled to equitable shared, provided they do not harm the stability of the other nations. In doing so, he protects Egypt’s prior appropriation claims against the encroachment of other the other NBC’s water rights. Clearly, the NBI has much more to achieve in regional cooperative and trust building measures.

            Without NGO participation and the resolution of Nile Basin issues, however, the NBI will never fully realize its goals of a shared vision or regional cooperation. While projects may be initiated and completed, they will ultimately fail to disentangle the problems surrounding equitable use of the Nile between NBCs while creating larger environmentally induced conflicts that further weaken the state. Any solutions to the problems taken on by the NBI must accept the core position of conflict between historic and sovereign water rights, which is complicated by the technical question of whether the river should be controlled by upstream or downstream riparian states. [68] Charrier et al argue that it is not enough to seek to increase the availability and usability of water, but also “necessary to reduce the demand for water by managing population size, enacting conservation measures, promoting awareness, and adopting water saving technologies and pricing techniques, especially in agriculture.” [69]

In addition to national and local governments holding the key responsibility to creating equitable solutions, Charrier et al maintain that the private sector, NGOs, international agencies can play a major role as investors and managers of utilities. [70] In order to resolve the challenges threatening stability in the Nile region, all actors in society, including business, government, civil society, academics, and individuals, should assume a common responsibility: to promote and elaborate a new water and environmental ethic, to educate the masses, to facilitate discourse, and to broaden the consultative role of NGOs and civil organizations. Regional discussions must be initiated by the NBCs, and include domestic and international NGOs, with indifferent facilitating parties. The solutions to regional conflict resolution and just development of water resources must be created between the NBCs without interference of outside parties with self-interest motivated agendas.