The Nile Basin Initiative:

Challenges to Implementation

[Part I] [Part II] [Part III]

The Nile Basin

            Conflict potential within the Nile Basin region intensifies as the pressures of population growth place stress on the political, economic, and social institutions of the NBCs. Moreover, as Haftendorn’s resource conflict theories contend, due to Ethiopia’s state weakness and its position along the Nile, conflict possibilities increase as the threats of water scarcity escalate. [1] Almost all NBCs face recurrent drought and rapid desertification compounded by abject poverty and have several features in common. These include widespread poverty, high dependence on agriculture, net food importers, and the absence of the necessary financial means to start large-scale engineering works, including water projects. [2] The optimism ingrained within the NBI’s mission and programs provides a source of resistance against these growing and seemingly insurmountable challenges facing the NBCs.  The success of the NBI would provide security and a sustainable water supply for downstream states and development opportunities for the upstream states like Ethiopia

. The failure of the NBI, however, would generate “more mistrust and suspicion among the riparian States, frustration on the part of the facilitators, and a full-fledged unilateralism, which would be a recipe for a conflict over the utilization of the Nile waters.” [3]

Regardless of the level of cooperation achieved by the NBI and the NBCs, countries like Ethiopia have reached the stage where they have no choice other than to utilize the Nile waters for irrigation, hydropower generation, and other population needs.

History of the Nile

            In the early 1900s, a relative shortage of cotton on the world market put pressure on Egypt and Sudan, then under British-Egyptian condominium rule, to focus on cotton cultivation, which required constant irrigation over the reliance on seasonal floods. The need for summer water and flood control guided an intense period of water development along the Nile, with conflicts focusing on the debate between upstream and downstream development involving supporters of Egyptian and Sudanese interests. [4] With the end of World War I, it became clear that any regional development plans for the Nile Basin would have to be preceded by a formal agreement on water allocations.

In 1920, the Nile Projects Commission was formed, with representatives from India, the United Kingdom, and the US. The Commission estimated that Egypt’s water needs would be 58 billion cubic meters (BCM) per year of the river’s average annual flow of 84 BCM per year. They also believed that Sudan would be able to meet irrigation needs from the Blue Nile alone. Recognizing that the Nile flow fluctuates greatly, the Commission attached its report with the suggestion that any gain or shortfall from the average be divided evenly between Egypt and Sudan. The Commission’s findings were not acted upon. [5]

During that same year, Britain published the Century Storage System, the most comprehensive scheme for water development along the Nile. It included designs for a storage facility on the Uganda-Sudan border, a dam at Sennar, Sudan to irrigate the Gezira region south of Khartoum, and a dam on the White Nile to hold summer floodwater for Egypt. [6] The plan worried Egyptians and was criticized by nationalists because all major control structures would have been beyond Egyptian territory and authority. Many Egyptians saw the plan as British means of controlling Egypt in the event of Egyptian independence. [7] In 1925, a new water commission made recommendations based on the 1920 estimates, which led to the 1929 Egyptian-Sudanese Nile Waters Agreement. Sudan was allocated 4 BCM per year, while Egypt reserved the entire flow from January 20 to July 15 and 48 BCM per year. [8]

The Aswan Dam, with a projected storage capacity of 1.56 BCM per year, was proposed in 1952 by the Egyptian government. Debate arose concerning whether construction would be a unilateral Egyptian project or a cooperative project with Sudan, which prevented Sudan from entering discussions until 1954. Subsequent negotiations, in the background of Sudan’s struggle for independence, focused on each country’s legitimate allocations and on concerns regarding whether the dam would serve the most efficient method of utilizing the Nile. Negotiations were often interrupted, producing indecisive results. Furthermore, Ethiopia, which had not been a major player in Nile hydropolitics, served notice in 1957 that it would pursue unilateral development in the Nile water resources within its territory. In 1958, resultant from futile negotiati ons, Egypt sent an unsuccessful mission into Sudanese territory, threatening to transform peaceful negotiations into military conflict. [9] Despite Sudanese independence in 1956, the Egyptian government waited to assume a more conciliatory approach to negotiations with the Sudanese military regime that gained power in 1958. Their strategies were in large part due to the urgency for a riparian agreement to obtain funding for the Aswan Dam. [10] In November 1959, the Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters (Nile Waters Treaty) was signed with the following provisions:

Egypt and Sudan determined that the combined needs of other riparians would not exceed one to two BCM per year. Any claims for additional allocations would be discussed under a unified Egyptian-Sudanese position. The provisions of the Treaty have been adhered to since its implementation. [12]

Nile Basin Initiative

In 1992, the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the NBCs launched an initiative to promote cooperation and equitable development of the entire Nile Basin. Six countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, formed the Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin (TECCONILE). The other four riparian states (Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Eritrea) participated as observers. Within this framework and with support from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Committee created the Nile River Basin Action Plan (NRBAP). [13] Soon after, in 1995, Project D3 was created by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to serve as a forum to maintain and monitor the legal and political dialogue surrounding Nile use. D3’s mission to develop a cooperative framework for management of the Nile was authorized by all countries during the Third Meeting of the Council of Ministers in February 1999. According to Girma Hailu from UNDP, without D3, the NBI would never have been realized. He states, “D3 brought all parties together, something that had never been done before. All previous attempts at regional cooperation failed because they were not comprehensive and proved to be exclusive by not including all active stakeholders.” [14]

To finance and implement the NRBAP, the Council of Ministers requested that the World Bank direct the coordination of inputs from external agencies. In 1996, the WB accepted the requests. Additionally, due to the engagement of CIDA and UNDP in Nile development projects, the WB suggested that leadership be a collaborative measure among the three donor agencies. [15] In January 1998, a Special Review meeting was held with senior officials from the NBCs, with discussions focusing on the joining of two approaches that would provide a structure for the revised NRBAP. These approaches, the Shared Vision Program (SVP) and the Subsidiary Action Program (SAP), would compliment each other through the formation of a common goal (SVP) and the development of mutually beneficial projects (SAP). [16]

In September 1998, the second meeting of the Nile Technical Advisory Committee (Nile-TAC) was in held in Tanzania, in which the Committee agreed on the terms of reference for the Nile-TAC, rules of procedure, policy guidelines and an action plan. In May 1999, Nile-TAC held a strategic planning and training workshop in Ethiopia, initiating the preparation of projects within the SVP. [17] At the Second World Water World Forum in the Netherlands in March 2000, senior officials from the NBI presented their "Shared Vision" for the first time to the international community. Then, during the eighth meeting of the Council of Ministers in Sudan, the Committee endorsed the priority projects prepared under the SVP and instructed the Nile-TAC to complete preparation of full project documents to be submitted to the Committee in December 2000. [18]

In June 2001, the first meeting of the International Consortium for Cooperation on the Nile (ICCON) met in Switzerland, formalizing the partnerships of the ten NBCs in “the equitable and sustainable development of the Nile through a common vision.” [19] According to World Bank documents, the ICCON, “as a unique forum envisioned as a long-term partnership of Nile States and the international community, will encourage further dialogue on cooperation, sustainable development, and poverty alleviation in the Nile Basin, while also offering a venue for raising and coordinating funding from a variety of sources.” [20]

            SVP’s mission is the creation of a “coordination mechanism and an enabling environment to realize the shared vision through action on the ground.” [21] The SVP covers seven projects:

            While the SVP projects differ in focus and scope, they build upon each other to form a coordinated program. The Council of Ministers states that the projects contribute to building a strong foundation for regional cooperation by supporting basin-wide engagement and dialogue, developing common strategic and analytical frameworks, building practical tools and demonstrations, and strengthening human and institutional capacity. [23] Through the anticipated benefits of the projects, the Committee expects to build the capacity to achieve and forge a “common vision” for the sustainable development of the Nile while paving the way for realization of investments on the ground through SAPs. [24]

            SVP’s counterpart, SAPs, will involve actual development projects, in collaboration with two or more countries at the sub-basin level, allowing for a move from planning (SVP) to action (SAP). While local and national governments will address their respective needs, acknowledging the importance of regional cooperation will address opportunities with transboundary implications. Therefore, according to the Committee, development actions on the ground need to be designed at the lowest appropriate level, referred to as “the principle of subsidiarity.” [25] The guidelines for the implementation of SAPs state:

Possible projects considered for SAP development include water supply and sanitation, irrigation and drainage development, hydropower development, watershed management, flood management, weed control, pollution control, efficiency improvements, promotion of trade and industry (including tourism and private investment), telecommunication development, marketing and storage of agriculture, and disaster forecasting and management. [27]

The World Bank maintains that the NBI will serve as a new development paradigm of regional cooperation that could help address many of the challenges of the basin and function as an example of how international waters can become catalysts for cooperation, development, and stability. [28] Currently, the NBI’s main focus requires collectively identifying and seeking funding from donors for “win-win” joint development projects such as the generation and export of hydropower, drought and flood control, and environmental management. [29] To achieve these ends, the Council of Ministers and donors emphasize the importance of confidence building and poverty alleviation with the ultimate plan to achieve a basin-wide legal and institutional framework for the joint management of the river. [30]

            While the potential success of the NBI provides a broad spectrum of physical projects and intangible regional benefits, the development of projects through the SVP and SAP have the potential to create and incite further conflict. Mekonen Loulseged, head of the Ethiopian Ministry of Water Resources’ Design Department and Chairman of Ethiopia’s SAP, reports that there are seven studies for proposed projects in Ethiopia, including the construction of hydroelectric dams and large-scale irrigation schemes. [31] The creation of hydroelectric sources would enable Ethiopia to export energy to Egypt, allowing Egypt to further industrialize and to reduce their need for agricultural water. Rushdie Saeed, demonstrating the argument against the creation of hydroelectric facilities and exporting power. He wonders “which countries Ethiopian officials have had in mind is difficult to determine, however, as none of Ethiopia’s neighbors are industrialized nations or great consumers of electricity.” [32] Regardless, as Giles maintains, improvements in watershed management would not only increase the water available, but also reduce silting problems from which Egypt and Sudan suffer with their downstream dams. [33] Kidane Asefa, technical advisor to the Ethiopian government, argues that damming and irrigation work in Ethiopia’s watershed would need $800 million, but conservation would be “for the sake of regional benefits.” [34] Dam proposals, however, also entail the resettlement of those currently living in the region slated for construction. Loulseged explained that before relocation, the Ethiopian government would provide local community consultations to ensure peaceful resettlements. Additionally, he stated “most of the hydropower generation sites in the highlands relocated deep in gorges where there is less population settlement.” Furthermore, according to Loulseged:

There will be a proper resettlement plan based on the will of the population to be resettled and within the same ethnic group when conditions permit. Social and environmental concerns will be properly addressed during detail study of specific project. The Ministry expects that present generations, who have little land to work with, will be willing to relocate. [35]

Relocation, as Homer-Dixon argues, increases the potential for ethnic rivalries, further weakening the state. In terms of development, increased levels of state instability in the Nile Basin possess the possibility for eventual state collapse. [36]

Egypt has begun to implement development projects under the auspices of its new national water plan. The basis of the new plan focuses on three pillars: working with upstream states on both the Blue and White Niles to develop new water resources, protecting water quality, and severely rationalizing the usage of Egypt’s share of the Nile. [37] For example, to reduce dependency on the Nile, the Egyptian Government has initiated the New Valley land reclamation project, a massive irrigation project in its western desert to persuade seven million Egyptians to move there from the over populated Nile Valley. When completed, a pipeline will carry up to five billion m³ of Nile water from the Lake Nasser reservoir to the New Valley site to facilitate the construction of new cities and provide irrigation to more than 200,000 hectares of desert. [38] If Egypt goes ahead with proposed plans, however, water take-off to the New Valley may reduce the level of the Nile to less than the necessary 1.5 meters required for draught of river boats. [39]

Despite both the positive and negative consequences of NBI projects, given Egypt’s regional dominance and historical disregard for other riparian states, the current level of cooperation under the auspices of the NBI is remarkable. [40] Despite this cooperation, however, problems remain. Such challenges include the lack of a legal framework, the maintenance of upstream-downstream conflicts of interest, the very real problems of poverty, the recurrent droughts, and the recent or ongoing armed conflicts in at least four, and between two, of the stakeholder countries which continue to create regional instability. Regardless of these problems, Posthumus argues, the NBI represents the most serious effort to solve the Nile Basin equation through dialogue and partnership. [41]   James Wolfensohn, WB President, describes the work as “a remarkable and fragile first step. It may the first time in history that we are able to have the scientific and technical resources, capacity, knowledge, and experience to come together.” [42]